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Chapter 4: Proposals
Land Use Law: Marred by Public Agency Abuse
Rodney L. Cobb*
Too often, land use law resembles a legal war rather than a set of
laws designed to foster the livability of American communities. A
minority of public agencies,1 abusing their powers in the land use law
arena, has unfortunately contributed to giving land use law its battle-
scarred complexion.2 There exists a plethora of literature written by
advocates of landowners or developers, commenting on these abuses
and seeking various legal remedies and solutions. This article,
however, is written by an advocate for land use planning and focuses
on how these abuses by public agencies impact on public interest
planning programs and ultimately on all private interests. After an
overview of these public agency abuses, their general and specific
impacts are explained along with why and how the abuses should be
addressed. In spirit, this article is written in celebration of the stellar
career of Daniel R. Mandelker, one of America’s leading gurus on
land use law, who I know well to be concerned both about land use
law’s fairness to landowners and its effectiveness for everyone’s
interests in our communities.
* Rodney Cobb is Staff Attorney for the American Planning Association and the Editor
of the Land Use Law and Zoning Digest. The author’s views and statements in this article are
not presented as those of the American Planning Association.
1. In this article “public agencies” refers to local, state, or federal agencies that deal with
the built and natural environment. This may refer to administrative agencies or to the local
legislature as well. While the vast majority of public agencies are of local government, many
state and federal agencies act to protect natural resources.
2. Saber rattling and mutual intimidation appears common in today’s land use law arena.
For example, earlier this year the newly elected Board of Supervisors of Loudon County,
Virginia showed its resolve to slow development and reserved nearly one million dollars to
defend itself against “almost certain challenges by home builders.” In a recent letter to the
Board, an attorney for the Northern Virginia Building Industry Association said the group
“intends to and will protect its interests as required.” Maria Glod, Loudon’s New Board Budgets
for Sprawl Fight, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 6, 2000, at A1.
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I. PUBLIC AGENCY ABUSES IN LAND USE LAW
A thorough survey of these abuses and a discussion of the related
legal remedies is a subject worthy of a large book or a multi-volume
treatise rather than this article; but a general description of the abuses
is needed to provide some context for addressing the abuses. It must
be noted that if abuse is perceived, and how often it occurs, can
depend on one’s perspective (a landowner, a law professor, a planner,
a developer, a judge, a municipal attorney, a developer’s attorney,
among others).3 On the other hand, for almost all actors in the land
use law arena, hearing the facts of case of City of Monterey4 was
similar to hearing fingernails scratching across a blackboard. During
a five-year period, the landowner sought approval of the city to
develop its 37.6 acres of oceanfront land originally for one thousand
housing units. The landowner prepared nineteen site plans, and the
city formally rejected its proposals five times including the final offer
to build less than two hundred housing units. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals found that the city “unfairly intended to forestall any
reasonable development of the Dunes.”5 The landowner eventually
sold the property. In oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court,
the Justices repeatedly emphasized the “five times.”6 While few
public agency actions are plainly abuses, the City of Monterey’s
actions clearly crossed the line between exercises of public authority
and an abuse of power. For the purposes of this article, public agency
abuses refer to actions similar to those in Monterey, in which, most
observers would agree, the agency should have known that its actions
3. In the interest of disclosing the author’s perspectives rather than being
autobiographical, the following is a list of the capacities in which the author has served in the
land use law arena: a developers’ attorney, a municipal planning director, a planning
commissioner, an adjunct law professor, a state zoning specialist, chair of a state river zoning
board, a staff attorney for the American Planning Association, and editor of Land Use Law and
Zoning Digest In the latter capacity, the author has read the majority of America’s state and
federal land use law cases for the last fifteen years at the court of appeals level and higher.
Serving in these capacities, the author has personally observed hundreds of local public agency
decisions and participated in scores of public agency decisions.
4. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
5. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1431-32 (9th
Cir. 1996).
6. Oral Argument, at 4, 16, 18. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, available at 1998 WL
721087.
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were not appropriate uses of their authority.
It is possible for public agencies to abuse their powers not only in
making decisions on rezonings or permit requests but also in the
entire range of activities, including planning studies, plan
development, adoption of implementation measures such as land use
regulations, appeals of land use decisions, and land use litigation.
Three of the more broad contexts in which these abuses occur are:
1. Public agency’s improper banishment of affordable housing
and other land uses perceived to be undesirable;7
2. the fracas over who will pay for the impacts of new
developments; and
3. severe regulations that do not allow development at all or to
a small degree.
Many of the public programs that allow no or too little
development are preservation or conservation responses to the
spreading of our cities into rural and environmentally sensitive areas.
Today more federal, state, and local public programs focus on a
variety of public purposes including farmland preservation, aquifer
protection, prevention of flooding, wetland protection, shoreline
protection, and habitat conservation for endangered species.8 While
conservation and protection are needed in these programs to various
degrees, some regulations have prohibited uses to the extent of
abusing landowners’ rights. In other words, some of the resource
protection programs’ regulations clearly should not have been
enacted without allowing some additional use of the property.9
7. This is referred to the “NIMBY” syndrome as reflected in the report: ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON REGULATORY BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING, “NOT IN MY BACK
YARD,” REMOVING BARRIERS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING (1991). This phenomenon is also
referred to by a number of other acronyms such as “LULUS” for “locally undesirable land
uses” and “NIMTOS” for “not in my term of office.”
8. The principal legal claim in this context is that the regulation causes a violation of the
Fifth Amendment Takings Clause (applicable to the states through the fourteenth Amendment),
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Courts
amend, V. See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of impact of public
agency abuse on courts.
9. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992) on remand
from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (state court determined
that development of two barrier reef lots was not a nuisance and thus state prohibition of
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The second major context in which abuses have occurred is also
related to increasing urbanization. As the urban fringe grew and new
infrastructure and other services were demanded, many public coffers
were strained and public agencies increasingly turned to landowners
and developers to up the ante to get development approval. Money,
land, easements, open space dedication, fire trucks, school impact
fees, park fees, and many other matters have been required of
landowners and developers in this context.10 The means of the public
agency demands have been many including an item of site plan
negotiations, a requirement imposed on an ad hoc basis as a condition
to the permit, or impact fees set by formula in an ordinance. Impact
fees have been required for a long menu of public appetites including
parks, schools, streets, utility lines, and more recently in lieu of
developers building low and moderate-income family housing.11
Unfortunately the contest of providing infrastructure and services for
new development has proven to be fertile ground for public agency
abuses as a minority of public agencies have focused on perceived
public needs rather than the fairness of demands of developers and
the relationship of the demands to the need created by the project
currently proposed.
The third general context for public agency abuses, excluding
specific uses, has been the most notorious historically. Rather than
prohibiting all or almost all uses, this context is one in which public
agencies target specific uses or categories of uses for exclusion such
as: less expensive single-family housing (in general, mobile homes,
manufactured homes), multifamily housing, group homes, billboards,
adult uses, and many other, thought to be undesirable for single-
family neighborhoods or an entire community. In terms of specific
facts, inappropriate exclusion may result from many public agency
development was a total taking).
10. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND
DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT AND FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE
DOLAN ERA (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 1995).
11. Id. at 125. THEODORE C. TAUB, EXACTIONS, LINKAGES, AND REGULATORY TAKINGS:
THE DEVELOPERS’ PERSPECTIVE. See also DANIEL R. MANDELKER, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF INCLUSIONARY ZONING: AN OVERVIEW (1990). See generally, INCLUSIONARY ZONING
MOVES DOWNTOWN 31 (Dwight Merriam et al. eds., 1985).
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actions such as delay tactics designed to prohibit development,12 the
laying out of the zoning districts and text that do not allow certain
uses, or the rushed amendment of an ordinance when the prior
ordinance allowed a proposed land use that the agency wants to
exclude.13
II. GENERAL IMPACTS ON LAND USE LAW
Our history of land use law is, in a sense, like focusing binoculars
away from public needs and in on the abuses. The everyday conduct
by a majority of communities conducting planning and administering
land use regulations and other programs in good faith is not
newsworthy. It is not highlighted in litigation; it does not stick in the
memory of many observers. Wrongdoing, however, makes an
impression. It sells news. It brings in legal fees; it clogs up the courts.
In a sense, righting the wrongs of government abuse plays well on
our strings of independence and anti-authoritarian nature still
ingrained in citizens of this nation born in revolution. In more recent
decades, finding and reporting public wrongdoing is chic after
Watergate and the War in Vietnam that fostered the nation’s distrust
in the public decisions.
Similarly, the more often an actor in the land use arena
experiences or observes public agency abuse, the more likely one’s
image of public agencies is to be changed. Certainly, for landowners
who have been the victims of the abuse, the image of local
government can change quickly. Individuals who most closely share
those experiences of the abused landowners are the professionals,
lawyers, and planners who represent them.14 These professionals seek
to gain public approval of development proposals and share the
experience of abuse by a minority of public agencies. The persons
next most keenly aware of this abuse are those professionals who see
public agencies partially or completely through the lens of court
cases: land use law attorneys and professors who teach land use law,
12. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
13. This may include any land use perceived to be undesirable and occurs, for example,
sometimes when the first adult use is proposed in a small town. See Eric D. Kelly, Local
Regulation of Lawful Sex Businesses, 51 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1999).
14. RICHARD F. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME (1969).
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and judges who deal with the cases about these abuses. To many
landowners, planners, attorneys, judges, and professors, the
wrongdoing tends to become their psychic image of public agencies
in the land use arena.
For professionals who experience their clients abuse by public
agencies and some observers, trying to fight and correct these abuses
becomes at least a minor theme of their careers. Movements and
organizations are formed to fight the abuses.15 Their image of public
agencies effects many of their activities in the realm of land use law.
They write articles, speak at seminars, hold seminars on the abuses
by local government, and create websites. Essentially these abuses
have created a strong active advocacy system against public agencies
and many public interest programs.
Furthermore, the abuses by a minority of communities have even
seriously eroded the vitality of advocacy for public interest programs.
Knowing and seeing the abuses makes it much more appealing for
planning and legal advocates to represent both public and private
clients and certainly these abuses create work for legal advocates.
Over time many once public interest-oriented attorneys now represent
almost exclusively private clients. Often seeing these abuses by a
minority of public agencies tends to lead even planning advocates to
the conclusion that although planning can reap some important
benefits for society, the power of public agencies to plan and regulate
must be tempered with measures to prevent the potential for agency
abuse of landowners. For example, Daniel R. Mandelker, has been a
proponent of not just planning but mandatory planning,16 now
focuses on both making planning more effective and protecting
individuals against public agency abuse by allowing more access to
the courts in takings issues17 and by shifting legal presumptions of
validity and constitutionality away from public agencies18 when a
15. Harvey M. Jacobs, The Anti-Environmental “Wise Use” Movement in America, 47
LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1995).
16. Daniel R. Mandelker, Should State Government Mandate Local Planning?...Yes, 44
PLANNING 14 (1978).
17. Professor Mandelker testified in favor of H.R 1534, allowing more access to federal
courts for takings claimants before the House Judiciary and Senate Judiciary Committees in
1998.
18. See Daniel R. Mandelker & A. Dan Tarlock, Two Cheers for Shifting the Presumption
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/8
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public agency’s political process does not operate fairly in
distributing burdens and benefits.19
III. SPECIFIC IMPACTS OF THESE ABUSES ON LAND USE LAW
A. COURTS
Through the decades of land use law, the abuses by a minority of
public agencies has increasingly influenced America’s case law. As
the architects of America’s case law, judges are among those in the
best position to see, and to be influenced by, evidence of public
agency abuse. For decades after the constitutionality of zoning was
affirmed in 1926 by the case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Company,20 the courts deferred largely to public agency actions,
giving them the presumption of validity. In the early 1960s, however,
observers and courts began to become increasingly aware of public
agency abuses in the context of exclusionary zoning and politically
whimsical decisions. Beginning in the 1970s the late Professor
Norman Williams, Jr. noted that the courts had become more active
in land use cases. He called this role “a sophisticated judicial review”
and described it as “a wiser, more skeptical and more realistic view
of local government and to the various parties in interest.”21 In the
late 1960s and early 1970s, Pennsylvania took the lead in trying to
resolve exclusion as an abuse of the zoning authority.22 In 1975 the
New Jersey Supreme Court issued its landmark decision addressing
the abuse of an exclusion by a suburban community of affordable
housing and requiring the acceptance of a developing community’s
fair share of the regional housing need.23
of Validity: A Reply to Professor Hopperton, 24 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 103 (1996); Daniel
R. Mandelker and A. Dan Tarlock, Shifting the Presumption of Constitutionality in Land-Use
Law, 24 URB. LAW. 1 (1992); Daniel R. Mandelker, The Shifting Presumption of
Constitutionality in Land Use Law, 4 J. OF PLANNING LIT 383 (1989).
19. Mandelker & Tarlock (1992), supra note 18, at 23.
20. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
21. AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 5.05, at 107 (1988 Supp. 1999). For a more
detailed description of the shifts in the state courts, see generally, id. at Chapters 5 and 6,
showing that many states had become suspicious of public agency actions by the early 1970s.
22. See DAVID H. MOSKOWITZ, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING LITIGATION 185-222 (1977).
23. Southern Burlington NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
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In the 1980s, after almost a half century of near complete
dormancy in land use law, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded its role
in land use cases in a way that yielded some strong counter measures
against public agency abuse that surprised many observers. The era
of the takings issue began. In 1981, in the case of San Diego Gas and
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 24 U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Brennan noted that a municipal attorney had said concerning the
remedy for an unconstitutional takings “[i]f all else fails, merely
amend the regulation and start over again.” 25 Justice Brennan called
for a money damages remedy for unconstitutional temporary takings
noting that “[t]he general notion of compensating landowners for
regulations which go too far has received much attention in land -use
planning literature.” 26
Justice Brennan’s comments harbingered the Supreme Court’s
landmark activism against public agency takings. In 1987 the
Supreme Court stated that money damages must be paid for
temporary takings by public agencies. 27 The same year, the Court
clarified that a public agency’s requirement of a lateral easement for
the public’s beach access must have an essential nexus to a
substantial state interest when a property interest is required of a
landowner. 28 In 1990 the Court created a new category of automatic
or per se takings (meaning that it was unnecessary to apply the
traditional takings tests) when it found that a regulation caused a total
deprivation of all economical use of property unless a nuisance is
being prevented or the regulation is consistent with principles of state
property law.29 In 1994, in the case of Dolan v. City of Tigard,30 the
Court added to the Nollan nexus test that for a public agency to
24. San Diego Gas and Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
25. Id. at 655 n.22 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 669 n.25.
27. First Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
28. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that required
beach access as a permit condition was an unconstitutional taking).
29. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (remanding a state’s
prohibition of building on two barrier reef lots to state court to assess whether a nuisance was
being prevented).
30. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding that a requirement of land for a
floodplain protections and adjacent land for bikepath was an unconstitutional taking because the
impact was not proportionate to the impact of a hardware stores expansion).
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require a property owner to give an easement for public use, the
public agency must show the requirement to be roughly proportionate
to the anticipated impacts of the proposed development. 31
Although some state courts had already become more activist
against public agency actions such as exclusionary zoning, 32 more
state courts now followed the U.S. Supreme Court‘s lead in further
protecting private property rights against excessive regulations or
exaction requirements. As Mandelker and Tarlock note, “[S]tate
courts, perhaps because they are closer to the ground, are less willing
to wink at what they perceive as a flawed political process.” 33 In
addition, they said that “recent ‘federalization’ of land-use law has
given state courts a variety to justify more intense scrutiny [of public
agency actions].”34 They continued by explaining that, “[t]he First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments are applied with varying degrees
of precision and rigor by state courts along with doctrines that are a
mix of federal and state constitutional law and legislation.” 35 The
Washington Court of Appeals, for example, shows an amazing
determination to expand the protection of the U.S. Supreme Court’s
rough proportionality test in Dolan beyond exactions. 36
31. Id. at 391.
32. See supra notes 22 and 23 and related text.
33. Mandelker & Tarlock (1992), supra note 18, at 3.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. The Washington Court of Appeals applied the Dolan test to a half street improvement
not involving an exaction, Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 972 P.2d 944 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1999). The case was appealed to the Washington Supreme Court. On May 24, 1999 in
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunces, the U.S. Supreme Court stated, in response to the Ninth
Circuit’s application of the Dolan test to site plan denials, that the rough proportionality test
does not apply “beyond the special context of exactions – land use decisions conditioning
approval of development on the dedication of property to public use.” 526 U.S. at 702. In light
of this statement, the Washington Supreme Court remanded the Benchmark to the Washington
Court of Appeals in light of the Court’s statement about the Dolan test and the case is pending.
In another case on June 21, the Washington Court of Appeals noted that  if the best
available sciences are not applied to developing policies and regulations for protecting critical
areas, as required by Washington’s Growth Management Act, WAS. REV. CODE ANN. 36.70A
(West 1991), then the Nollan/Dolan test may be violated. Honesty in Envtl. Analysis and
Legislation v. Central Puget Sound Growth Management Hearings Bd., 979 P.2d 864, 871
(Wash. App. 1999) Then the appeals court went on to say, “[w]hile the United States Supreme
Court has said that the nexus and rough proportionality rules do not apply to outright denial of a
project, we decline to adopt the dicta that Nollan and Dolan may be applied only to dedications
of land required to allow a development to proceed.” Id.
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B. Legislation
The judicial response to public agency abuse has had a loud echo
in the hallowed halls of state capitals and Congress. State legislators
and members of Congress, who do not see a steady stream of abuses
in court cases, nevertheless hear fresh horror stories of public agency
abuses in legislative debates. In Congress, the proposals for
legislation to protect landowners from public agency abuses have
been varied and include better access to federal courts for
landowners’ taking claims 37 and challenges to many federal
environmental statutes is perennial, with many proposals claiming
justification based on the statutes’ harsh impacts on private property
rights. Similarly, the strong trend in federal statutes preempting local
regulations is, to some degree, related to preventing excessive agency
regulation of religious institutions, 38 group homes,39
telecommunication facilities, 40 signs,41 airports,42 and manufactured
housing.43
State legislators have reacted even more dramatically than
members of Congress to public agency abuses. They, like their
counterparts in state courts, are closer to the ground 44 than federal
lawmakers. In addition, state legislators are likely to sense a high
degree of responsibility to deal with public agency abuses that arise
in the local exercise of state powers delegated by the state lawmakers
to local agencies in enabling legislation. As a result, state lawmakers
have adopted an astonishing variety of new statutes to alleviate local
agency abuses.45
37. The Private Property Rights Act of 1999, H.R. 2372, is currently pending in Congress
and calls for greater access to federal courts for landowners’ takings claims.
38. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993), overturned in City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
39. See Federal Fair Housing Act, 47 U.S.C. § 3601-3619, 3604(a).
40. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7).
41. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., FEDERAL LAND USE LAW (1999), § 2.10 Federal
Preemption of Local Land Use Regulations.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See supra note 32 and related text.
45. These laws cover topics such as protecting nonconforming uses, CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 8-2 (1997), state imposed uniform site development standards, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-1 -
29 (West 1991), deemed approval of proposed developments if decisions are not rendered by
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/8
p195+Cobb.doc 01/04/01
2000] Land Use Law 205
The most remarkable responses in the 1980s and 1990s have been
the unprecedented proposals and adoptions of takings legislation
fueled by the newly-minted federal takings jurisprudence. 46 Until
recently, the takings legislation did three things: required or
encouraged assessment of impact of public agency actions on private
property rights, required or encouraged compensation for diminutions
in value of private property, or required or encouraged mediation.
More recently, under the aegis of takings legislation, Arizona adopted
“takings legislation” that requires landowner approval for rezoning of
their property.47
IV. SOLVING PUBLIC AGENCY ABUSES
A. REALIZATION
The first step toward solutions is the realization of fallout of
public agency abuses. An important part of this realization is that
only a minority of communities intentionally abuse the rights of
landowners. 48 In other words, a minority of public agencies are
creating havoc in land use law for the vast majority of public
agencies who are acting in good faith to do the best jobs they can for
creating or maintaining a livable built and natural environment in
America. The abusive public agencies, rather than acting in isolation,
public agencies within time limits, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10908(9) (West 1997), conflict
of interest statutes, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-11 (1997), anti-exclusionary statues for needed and
reasonable land uses, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 125.227a (1997), statutes allowing certain uses in
single-family zones (such as group homes, NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.021 (1999), or child day
care services, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 125.216g) (1997), and statutes requiring communities to
plan for and promote the building of affordable housing, OR. REV. STAT. § 197.295-307 (1997)
and CAL. GOVT. CODE § 69515 (1994). In addition, many states have adopted impact fee
legislation protecting private interests. See, for a survey and discussion of impact fee legislation
that addresses both public and private interests, Martin L. Leitner and Susan P. Schoettle, A
Survey of State Impact Fee Enabling Legislation, in EXACTIONS, IMPACT FEES AND
DEDICATIONS: SHAPING LAND-USE DEVELOPMENT AND FUNDING INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE
DOLAN ERA 60 (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 1995).
46. See Harvey M. Jacobs, The Impact of State Property Rights Laws: Those Laws and
My Land, 50 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1998). See also Robert H. Freilich and Roxanne
Doyle, Taking Legislation: Misguided and Dangerous, 46 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3
(1994).
47. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-829(A) (1998).
48. There are a few exceptions. For example, more than a minority of communities
exclude affordable housing from many communities.
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are in many ways linked with all other public agencies. Specifically,
the few abusive public agencies have greatly harmed the public
perception as to the worthiness of public agencies to deal with the
public interest in the built and natural environment. This minority of
abusive public agencies has undermined the advocacy system for
land use planning and regulation. They have created an increasingly
strong advocacy system against all public agencies and land use
planning; 49 and they have seriously undermined political, moral, and
financial support for many essential public interest programs. In the
courts the abuse has created formidable case law that applies to,
intimidates, and chills the effectiveness of all public agencies. To
deal with this case law in litigation, many public agencies that act in
good faith must misdirect human, financial, and all types of resources
away from fulfilling their charge to deal effectively with American’s
interest in land use related resources. Similarly, in some instances the
abuses have caused a talent drain that has affected the quality of
performance of public agencies and discouraged some quite talented
citizens from public service with public agencies because the
potential for civil rights actions against them as individuals is
intimidating. The intimidation of all public agencies, the costs of
litigation, and actual damages from court decisions spawned from
this abuse has grown. Many of the remaining advocacy groups and
associations in America have spent vast resources trying to prevent
the untoward law from spreading as case law in other jurisdictions. 50
In addition, the abuses take a tremendous toll on the quality of the
built and natural environment that the minority of abusive agencies,
as well as all public agencies, have the duty to try to deal with
effectively. Because all public agencies have to deal with the fallout
of the abusive agencies, their scarce resources for implementing
public interest programs are diminished.
The greatest threat of harm from these abuses is to America’s
future. Other than the courts, the other set of principal architects of
American’s land use law that determines the effectiveness of all
public agencies are federal and state legislatures. The effectiveness of
49. See Jacobs, supra note 15.
50. This author serves as staff to the American Planning Association Board’s Amicus
Curiae Brief Committee.
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public agencies to deal with the built and natural environment is
especially precarious in state legislatures where lawmakers decide the
terms of planning enabling legislation. Here a public agency’s
reputation and integrity with respect to land use planning and
regulation is critical for all Americans. The risk is heightened
because a majority of the states have badly outdated 1920s’
legislation to apply in comprehensive land use planning. 51 This
legislation is critical because it provides the framework for the public
agency effort to deal with urban sprawl. At issue is essentially
whether the built and natural environment will be designed by the
beneficial development rules of comprehensive land use planning
rather than the harmful development rules that result in urban sprawl.
Under the rules intrinsic to urban sprawl, many metropolitan
centers are suffering as jobs and affluent Americans have moved
outward leaving behind those who cannot move. These rules of the
development game came from many directions, were all unintended,
and yet converge on the edge of the latest suburb to continue the
sprawl unnecessarily abandoning and cloning built environments and
consuming land and other natural resources. 52 Waste, as well as the
disparities of social, employment, and housing opportunities, abound.
Rather than design by sprawl, planning statute reform is the way
to interject some rational development rules. This legislation can
encourage the use of comprehensive land use planning to spend
public dollars efficiently on new infrastructure that will not be
abandoned, it can match housing with jobs to link residential and
business areas by transportation that makes sense for both privileged
and under-privileged Americans. 53
What planning statute reform does is better the odds that the
51. Rodney L. Cobb, Toward Modern Statutes: A Survey of State Laws on Local Land-
Use Planning, in PLANNING COMMUNITIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 7 (SPECIAL REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION’S GROWING SMARTSM PROJECT (1999).
52. Bruce Katz & Jennifer Bradley, Divided We Sprawl, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1999,
at 26.
53. Oregon is a good example. Portland encourages higher densities in its more central
area, promotes a variety of housing, sets some urban growth limits, and is escaping paralyzing
traffic with a light rail system that serves the Portland area. There has been no new construction
to increase road capacity in Portland in the last two decades. Oregon was once losing thirty
thousand acres of agriculture per year and now that has decreased to two thousand acres per
year. See The Sierra Club, The Sierra Club Rates the States, in SOLVING SPRAWL (1999).
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irrational development rules of sprawl will be displaced by the
rational development rules of comprehensive planning. After
planning statute reform, more communities will simply be conducting
effective planning that designs the urban and rural areas with rational
development rules. For example, a state with a reformed law will
have all or near one hundred percent of its public agencies planning,
and the new law will guide the local planning to address thoroughly
all types of housing and coordinate such with jobs and transportation.
Legislative reform thus is needed in all states independent of how
the state’s population may be changing overall. Ten coastal states
with rapidly increasing populations have vastly updated their
planning legislation, but half of the states have legislation authorizing
local planning similar to 1920s’ model legislation. 54 These states,
however, suffer because they are designed by sprawl even if they are
not fast growing states. For example, Pennsylvania has had a stable
population since the 1960s, and before that it was merely slow-
growing.55 However, the first fifty-five thousand people in Lancaster
City, Pennsylvania from nineteenth century development, occupied
seven square miles but its next fifty-five thousand people from post
World War II sprawl consumed seventy Square miles. 56 This is a
tenfold increase in land consumption for Lancaster City caused by a
population simply moving around in a state that, as a whole,
maintained a stable population.
Not surprisingly, twelve states have recently commissioned or
completed state-sponsored studies of how to deal with smart growth
issues.57 These and other states’ decisions to reform state planning
legislation will determine much about the quality of our futures—
how America will develop, how long affluent persons will spend in
traffic, whether disadvantaged persons will have housing or jobs or
54. See Cobb supra note 50.
55. U.S. Census Bureau, Selected Historical Census Data, Population and Housing
Counts, Table 16. Population 1790 to 1990, (March 1, 2000), available at
<http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/table-16.pdf>.
56. Telephone Interview with Paul  Thibault, Chairman, Lancaster County Commissioner,
Lancaster, Pennsylvania (Dec. 7, 1999).
57. Stuart Meck, Executive Summary: Status of State Planning Reform, in PLANNING
COMMUNITIES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 2, SPECIAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PLANNING
ASSOCIATION’S GROWING SMARTSM PROJECT (1999).
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good schools, and whether we will sprawl physically and
ideologically or will have a sense of community, oneness as a
country, and as a democracy.58
Thus, public agencies have duties to perform that are critical to
the quality of life in America. They need modernized statutes to meet
these challenges. However, state legislators may be reluctant to give
public agencies new, innovative tools to deal with urban sprawl and
to meet the other thorny challenges at stake in statutory reform.
Continued public agency abuses will not only block critically needed
statutory reform but will cause lawmakers to continue taking away
legislative powers from public agencies, further undermining the
ability of all public agencies to perform their duties at this critical
juncture in America’s desperate bout with urban sprawl. 59
B. Lasting Solutions
Because so much is at stake, solutions to the abuse must be found.
The real lasting solutions are those that prevent the abuses in the first
instance rather than focusing on correcting the abuses. Victims of the
abuse should not have to sue to get rights or to be treated fairly their
rights should not have been violated in the first instance. Public
agencies that commit these abuses must have a sense of urgency
about stopping these actions. They must fully realize that they are
responsible for the harsh impacts of their actions on everyone’s
interests, as discussed above. Many agencies have a history of
litigation with landowners, but the agencies must still treat all private
parties as they would like to be treated if they were in the
landowners’ shoes no matter what the history of transactions with the
applicant.60
Beyond this initial solution, governments appointing the public
58. See Katz & Bradley, supra note 52, at 42 (arguing against sprawl because of the
attendant loss of sense of place, lack of commitment to community, discouragement of free
association, and undermining of participation in democracy–a “cultural agrophobia that depletes
public life”).
59. Public agency abuses have made discussions about giving full  or new authorities to
public agencies much more of a challenge in designing model statutes in the American Planning
Association’s Growing Smart SM Project. See Meck, supra note 57.
60. This applies to all aspects of the public  agency actions including laying out of zones,
enforcement of regulations, and even litigation strategies.
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agencies would be wise to train or retrain agency members to make
sure that abuse, its consequences, and fairness are thoroughly
understood in all aspects of their duties. In doing so, governmental
leaders should make it clear that the abuses are not tolerable, per se,
and for continued membership in the public agencies. Because the
training’s purpose is to prevent abuses, it should be routine with all
public agencies and each new member. 61
In some senses, however, municipalities are arms of state
governments and solutions beyond training may be in order for state
legislatures. Parallel to the training, some states may want to adopt
measures that can be used if the abuses continue. For example, if a
public agency of a local government continues to abuse the rights of
landowners, then the state, via legislation, may want to reserve the
right to appoint a hearing officer to conduct the public agency’s
business. 62
The timing and design of other solutions are even more intricate.
A “meat axe” approach to legislative solutions to agency abuses is
not sufficient when surgery is needed. Unfortunately, many
discussion, about withholding needed planning or regulatory tools
unfold along the lines of: We know that there are abuses, thus the
planning or regulatory authority should be withdrawn, 63 not given, or
allowed to be used only under narrow circumstances. Alas, we all
have too much at stake to design solutions, legislative or otherwise,
to perceived abuses based on generalizations or horror stories. If only
a minority of public agencies are abusing a specific power, then
training should suffice. Yet, to cut back on the authority to plan and
61. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 278.0265 (1999) (requiring a governing board of a
regional planning commission to “prescribe an appropriate course of at least 12 hours of
training in land-use planning”). In addition, APA’s Growing Smart SM Project, a multi-year
effort to draft the next generation of model planning and zoning statutes for the U.S., § 7-
105(8), also requires the local planning agency to conduct both initial and ongoing training and
continuing education programs for commissioners on how to meet their duties.
62. BABCOCK, supra note 14, said that “[t]here is among professionals–lawyers, planners,
and, indeed, politicians–an increasing restlessness with the layman’s power over land-use
regulation.” Id. at 38. Some states have moved significantly toward the use of hearings officers.
For example, over seventy-five percent of the population of the State of Washington have
hearing officers make their public land use decisions. See WASH. REV. CODE § 36.70.970
(2000). Telephone Conversation with Ronald L. McConnell, McConnell/Burke Inc. (Mar. 1,
2000). McConnell serves as a hearings officer for twelve Washington municipalities.
63. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 11-829(A) (1998).
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regulate will hit all public agencies, the majority of whom do not
abuse their powers and need these authorities to effectively plan and
regulate.
For these reasons, before a legislature adopts a statute intended to
curb public agencies’ abuse— perhaps withdrawing or setting
conditions on its planning or regulatory powers— the lawmakers
should assess the abuses and the related public interests. For example,
aspects of the abuses that should be objectively assessed are the
frequency of abuses, the number and percentage of public agencies
that commit the abuses, the impact of the abuse on private
landowners, and the frequency of litigation. In addition, alternative
solutions should be assessed in terms of how well they would stop the
abuses and the extent of their impacts on the agency’s effectiveness
in dealing with everyone’s interests in the built and natural
environment. The considered impacts on a public agency’s functions
should include the value of the authority to protect public interests
and the chilling effect on the agency’s effectiveness. For example,
takings legislation specifying that takings for which monetary
damages must be paid, 64 would have an obvious chilling effect on a
public agency’s effectiveness. 65
If a study of the abuses proves that they are widespread and it is
obvious that training would not help the victims of the abuse, perhaps
innovative legislation can prevent the abuse without sacrificing the
other public interests involved. For example, exclusionary single-
family zoning is not an abuse that can be said to be committed by
only a minority of public agencies. 66 At the same time, completely
64. See Jacobs & Freilich, supra note 46.
65. Id. The chilling of public interests has played a key role in the overturning of taking
legislation in Washington and Arizona. See Telephone Interview with Frank Bangs, Jr.
Attorney, Lewis and Roca, LLP, Tucson, Arizona (Feb. 25, 2000), Private Property Rights
Protection Act, §§ 37-220-222 renumbered as §§ 221-223 (1992) repealed by Referendum
Proposition 300, 1994 (concerning Arizona); Telephone Interview with Steve Lundin,
Washington House of Representatives Legislative Counsel, (Mar. 2, 2000), Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 64.42.005-.009 (West 1995) repealed by Initiative Measure No. 164, Wash. Leg.
Session 1995/1996 (concerning Washington). Currently the Missouri General Assembly is
considering takings legislation that calls for a compensable taking to occur with a twenty
percent diminution of value in land because of a regulatory program. See H.B. 1798 (Mo.
2000).
66. See Richard F. Babcock, The Egregious Invalidity of the Exclusive Single-Family
Zone, 35 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 4 (1983). See also Norman Williams, Jr. et al., The
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doing away with single-family zoning is not a realistic option. To
resolve this dilemma legislators can adopt a statute requiring
developing communities to have their regional fair share of housing
for low income families to the case law which evolved in New Jersey
in the Mt. Laurel cases67 and in statutes adopted by California and
Oregon.68 Other statutes that may curb some prevalent abuses with no
or minimal impact on the public agency’s effectiveness are those that
address delays in public agency decisions. 69
Members of the legal profession tend to, have a Pavlovian
tendency to regard the courts as solutions to a variety of legal, social,
political, ethical issues. So why not use the courts to solve public
agency abuse? Generalizations are dangerous when incorporated into
in any answer to the question because there are many types of abuse
and not all of them are intentional. 70 In short, the havoc from our
current litigious postures must cease. There appear to be no reasons
why courts should be the first resort rather than the last resort for
solving public agency abuse. Yet, there are many reasons why all
concerned should try to avoid litigation if at all possible. 71 Victims of
abuse should not have to sue to get the fairness, rights, and respect
owed them by public agencies. Litigation is a legal war and it, like
violence, begets itself.
Strategy on Exclusionary Zoning: Towards What Rationale and What Remedy?, 6 LAND USE
CONTROLS ANNUAL 177 (1972). See generally CHARLES M. HAAR AND JEROLD S. KAYDEN,
ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM: PROMISES STILL TO KEEP (1989).
67. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel (II), 456 A.2d
390 (N.J. 1983); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel (I), 336 A.2d
713 (N.J. 1975).
68. See supra note 45.
69. Id.
70. These comments on the limitations of courts are made with all due respect and
admiration to Daniel Mandelker’s scholarly writings on presumption shifting.  See Mandelker
(1989) and Mandelker & Tarlock (1992, 1996), supra note 18.
71. Of course, abatement of land use litigation not involving public agency abuse may
prove to be more difficult but should be addressed. See infra note 72. The combinations of
litigants in land use litigation are endless. Even a simplified model of this litigation involves
three parties: public agencies, applicants for development permits, and the neighbors.
Neighbors often sue both public agencies and applicants. Sometimes applicants sue neighbors
in “slapp” suits strategic litigation against public participants (sometimes the public participants
are other third parties such as environmental groups). Outside of the model of these three types
of litigants, many other types of litigants are involved in land use law. Sometimes, for example,
one government will sue another over annexation or to affirm that the other government’s land
use in the plaintiff governments jurisdiction is subject to its zoning.
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What if there were a perfect legal system with refined legal tests
for every type of abuse and easy access to the courts? Courts are not
legislatures or architects of public land use policy. Moreover,
litigation followed as a solution benefits only professionals who gain
from litigation. With courts as a first resort the face of land use law
would still closely resemble war. A lack of mutual trust, threats, high
legal costs on both sides, and litigation delays would continue.
Litigation is part of the problem and blocks long term solutions
outside of the courtroom. The point is not that any entities other than
the abusive public agencies are responsible. The point is that public
agencies cannot implement real long term solutions alone now that
the legal shoving match seems the pastime of the century’s end. 72
Getting, thinking, and staying out of the “litigation box” that
today’s current land use law resembles will take time. It has to start
with all the participants resolving to strive in good faith to eventually
find solutions outside of the court room. As the late Richard Babcock
noted, “What is required from all participants, laymen, planners,
lawyers, and judges is an effort to turn zoning from the petty
parochial device it now is to a viable tool of land use policy.” 73
The second goal is to reach a point where public agencies and
those they serve are not mutually distrustful and fresh from the last
round of legal contests. 74 Realistically, the public sector must begin
to implement the solutions above before their former victims will
vaguely consider trusting them. That is, the implementation will have
well established before victims take their legal counsel off the speed
dial on their cell phones. This trust can begin to be built by the
governments and their public agencies by heavily consulting and
72. See Glod, supra note 2.
73. BABCOCK, supra note 14, at 111. In addition, staying outside of the courtroom must
involve others. “‘The problem is the no -growthers and radical envi ronmentalists who have
become adroit at manipulating the system,’ Howard said in a phone interview from his
Washington, D.C., office. ‘You can never get a final decision about what you can or cannot do.’
Howard said that in some instances property owners have waited up to twenty years for courts
to decide whether a case really should be heard by local planners.” Jim Dalgleish, Property
Rights and Local Control at Odds in Congress, THE HERALD-PALLADIUM, Feb. 28, 2000 (St.
Joseph-Benton Harbor Michigan) (Jerr y Howard, is a Senior Staff Vice President with the
National Association of Home Builders).
74. Mediation is even a preferred solution to litigation if mediation itself will not detract
from the priority of preventing abuses and litigious mind sets.
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involving private landowners and builders in designing legislation
and actually training public agency employees. The public sector
must start here to convince private individuals that their intent is
sincere, that the resolve to stop the abuses is permanent, and that the
public sector knows that everyone loses when public agencies abuse
their powers.
CONCLUSION
In a real sense, land use law is held hostage and undermined by
public agencies abusing their powers. The burden to solve this
problem is initially on those public agencies that have been abusing
their powers. Eventually, the abuses will be stopped one way or
another. If public agencies stop the abuses, the chances to stay out of
courts are maximized, a general restoration of faith in public agencies
as caretakers of our futures in the built and natural environment can
occur, and the potential for legislative reform and for all public
agencies to be effective in their duties is maximized. To the degree
that the agencies continue the abuses, courts and legislatures will
correct the abuses, but public agencies will lose much of their
legislative authority to regulate. Similarly, statutory reform will occur
less often because a lack of faith in public agencies and the built and
natural environment will more frequently unfurl according to the
harmful development rules of urban sprawl rather than the beneficial
development rules of comprehensive urban planning. In the latter
scenario land use law will more closely resemble war, in the former
scenario it will more closely resemble its public purposes.
The responsibility is clearly on the abusive public agencies to stop
the abuse in order that land use law can reorient to its original
positive purposes rather than focusing on the dark side of land use
law— public agency abuses. These agencies and all other parties in
the land use law arena, however, must act quickly because the
litigation train has much momentum, and it will take the efforts of
more than just the public agencies to put land use law on the right
track toward America’s best future.
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